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The Horn of Africa and the US “War on Terror”  
with a  Special Focus on Somalia1 
 
 
Bjørn Møller2  
 
 
Abstract 
Even though the war on terror proclaimed by President Bush after 9/11 2001 has 
mainly focused on Afghanistan and Iraq, the Horn of Africa has also featured 
quite prominently. The US assumes that this subregion is particularly prone to 
terrorism, both in the sense of a battlefield, breeding ground and hiding place for 
terrorists—especially of the Islamist or Jihadist brand. These assumptions have 
motivated the launch of several regional counter-terrorist initiatives. Closer 
analysis of the historical record and the available statistics, however, provide no 
empirical support for these assumptions. On the contrary, the incidence of 
terrorism on the Horn is generally quite low, most terrorist incidents are 
politically motivated, and those in which religion plays a role have mainly been 
perpetrated by a sectarian Christian movement, the Lord’s Resistance Army.  
 
The paper then focuses on Somalia, showing how statelessness has persisted 
since 1991, yet with some redeeming features and significant elements of order. 
This incipient stateless order was upset by US attempts, in the Spring of 2006, of 
forging a counterterrorist alliance of warlords. This provoked a countervailing 
alliance of Islamic courts which emerged victorious in the summer of 2006, 
taking control of Mogadishu and most of the rest of the country. This in turn 
provoked an Ethiopian military intervention in December 2006, ostensibly in 
                                                          
1  This paper was presented at the Horn of Africa Workshop: What is the Way out: 
Challenges in Overcoming Governance Crises, Endemic Conflicts and Negative External 
Involvements in the Horn of Africa? The workshop took place May 26, 2008 at Aalborg 
University and was hosted by Development, Innovation and International Political 
Economy Research (DIIPER) in Collaboration with Centre for Comparative Integration 
Studies (CCIS), Aalborg University. 
2  Bjørn Møller is Senior Researcher at DIIS. He holds an MA in History and a Ph.D. in 
International Relations, both from the University of Copenhagen. Since 1985, he has been 
(senior) researcher at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), which in 2003 
became part of the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), where he is attached 
to the Defence and Security research unit. He served as Secretary General of the 
International Peace Research Association (IPRA) from 1997 to 2000, was external 
lecturer at the Institute of Political Studies, University of Copenhagen from 1994 to 2006 
and at the Centre of African Studies since 2002. In the academic year 2003/04, he served 
as Visiting Associate Professor at the research centre on Development and International 
Relations (DIR) at Aalborg University, where he is presently external lecturer. In addition 
to being the author of numerous articles and editor of seven anthologies, he is the author 
of three books. 
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support of the otherwise moribund and impotent Transitional Federal 
Government and with explicit US support. Having defeated the Union of Islamic 
Courts, however, neither the TFG nor Ethiopia, the African Union or the United 
States have been able to restore order in the country which has, moreover, been 
designated as a battle ground for the war against the infidels by the Al Qaeda 
network.  
 
 
1. Preface 
The Horn of Africa has long attracted the attention of external players, first in 
the era of European colonialism and then during the Cold War when it became 
an arena for the global struggle between East and West. Most recently, it has 
drawn the attention of the United States as a potential hotspot of international 
terrorism, as a consequence of which Washington has launched several 
programs, all intended to prevent or defeat terrorism in the Horn of Africa.  
 
The paper critically investigates some of the underlying assumptions of these 
program, finding most of them to be unfounded. It then proceeds to zoom in on 
Somalia, which has especially been in the spotlight in recent years. The article 
provides an account and analysis of the issues of nationalism, religion, clanism 
and state-building in post-independence Somalia as a preliminary to a more 
detailed study of the recent crisis, pitting a weak transitional government backed 
by neighboring Ethiopia against a loose union of Islamic courts. It concludes by 
outlining two possible scenarios for the future—an optimistic, but unlikely and a 
more likely, but profoundly pessimistic one.   
 
 
2. External Powers in the Horn of Africa 
The Horn of Africa (HoA) subregion is here defined as 
comprising Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and 
Sudan, but other analysts have included Kenya in the 
subregion, while some have excluded Sudan from it.1 
One also sometimes encounters the term “Greater HoA”, 
defined as comprising the Horn itself as well as Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania. In-between the two is the 
delimitation of the subregional organization IGAD 
(Intergovernmental Authority on Development), to which 
Kenya and Uganda, but not Tanzania, belong.2  
 
Not only the United States but other external powers have long played important 
role in the HoA. During the scramble for Africa in the late 19th Century,3 both 
the UK, France and Italy were eager to impose their colonial suzerainty over 
parts of the subregion.  
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• The French established themselves in French Somaliland, i.e. the present Djibouti.4  
• The Italians made bits for Somalia where they established a colony in the southern 
parts,5 as well at for the present Eritrea and Ethiopia. They were, however, defeated 
by the latter in 1896 in the famous battle of Adwa.6  
• The lion’s share was, as elsewhere, taken by the British, who not only established 
themselves in British Somaliland, i.e. the present Somaliland. They also beat the 
French to the control of the Sudan (at Fashoda)7 over which they established a 
peculiar form of condominium rule jointly with Egypt.8  
 
As elsewhere in the world, however, the United States showed no particular 
interest in establishing colonies. On the other hand, the Ethiopian empire 
embarked on a project of territorial expansion into neighboring territories, 
representing a form of intra-African imperialism.9  
 
The colonial period also saw isolated instances of what is most appropriately 
called national liberation, but might today have been labeled “Islamist 
terrorism,” especially in Sudan and British Somaliland. The Mahdist revolt from 
1881-1885 against combined Egyptian-Ottoman rule was led by Muhammed 
Ahmad (1843-1885) who proclaimed himself Mahdi, i.e. “righteous”.10 
Demanding the establishment of an Islamic state and the imposition of shari’a, 
he proclaimed a jihad against the infidels, thus launching what essentially 
amounted to a war of national independence for Sudan. His followers were a 
blend of devout ordinary Muslims and former slave traders, whose business had 
been damaged by the British anti-slavery raids11 and the imposition by the UK 
of anti-slavery legislation in Egypt (hence also in Sudan). The armed struggle of 
the Mahdist Dervishes was remarkably successful, leading by 1884 to an 
Egyptian withdrawal followed by the fall of Khartoum to the Dervishes and the 
establishment of the Islamic state, the Mahdiyah. Upon the death in 1885 of the 
Mahdi, his successor Abdallahi ibn Muhammad established a khalifate, which 
proceeded with the jihad , e.g. with raids into southern Sudan and even Ethiopia 
and Egypt.12 These offensives, however, brought the UK into the struggle in a 
big way. London in 1895 this issued an order to reconquer Sudan, in which 
endeavor the British forces finally succeeded in the battle of Omdurman in 
September 1898, followed by a total collapse of the Mahdist forces in November 
1898.13 In the following decades the Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule saw a 
few small Mahdist rebellions (in 1900, 1902/03, 1904, 1908 and 1916), but none 
that represented a serious challenge.14  
 
Even though it followed the tradition of indirect rule, British colonialism in 
northern Somalia was contested by parts of the local population, partly inspired 
by the Mahdist revolt in Sudan, and led by the Sheik Mohammed Abdile 
Hassan. In 1895 he launched a religiously-inspired revolt (the Darawiish or 
Dervish revolt) in 1895. It featured guerilla warfare, but also established de facto 
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statehood in liberated parts of the territory. This revolt by the “Mad Mullah” (as 
he was called by the British) was only quelled around 1920, partly by means of 
rather brutal air strikes.15  
 
Whereas the First World War had no major impact on the HoA, its successor 
produced as certain rearrangement of the colonial map, as the UK managed to 
dislodge Italy from its possessions. These included Ethiopia which the fascist 
regime in the 1930s had finally managed (with the utmost brutality) to subdue 
and incorporate it into its Africa Orientale Italiana.16 Having liberated Ethiopia, 
the UK in 1942 recognized its independence while maintaining its hold on parts 
of its territory and playing around with ideas of a “Greater Somalia” and/or an 
East African federation until 1954.17 By and large, however, the colonial map 
maintained intact until the wave of independence hit the HoA in the late 1950s. 
As in most other parts of the continent, independence was achieved around 1960 
and generally without major conflicts, yet followed by a slight reshuffling of the 
territorial cards. Formerly Italian Eritrea was thus first federated with 
independent Ethiopia and subsequently incorporated directly,18 while British and 
Italian Somalia merged almost immediately after independence.19  
 
By that time, however, the subregion was partly subjected to the Cold War 
dynamics, coming to be viewed by both East and West as part of the “grand 
chessboard” of global geopolitics,20 albeit merely an arena of minor importance, 
where involvement mainly took place in the form of arms provisions, sometimes 
in return for base rights.21 Because of the weakness of the states in the 
subregion, however, even such a minor and half-hearted involvement by a great 
or superpower could make a tremendous difference. Even though the HoA was 
thus very much “penetrated” by the global East-West conflict, the impact of the 
latter fell short of “overlay” in the terminology of Barry Buzan and associates.22 
The pattern of alignment was neither altogether clear nor particularly durable as 
the “ties of amity and enmity” to a large extent remained indigenous—the most 
persistent being the perennial Ethiopian-Somali rivalry.  
 
As argued by Jeffrey Lefebvre, “one cannot be friends with both Ethiopia and 
Somalia. Those who wish to meddle in the affairs of the Horn must be prepared 
to choose sides.”23 During the Cold War, both superpowers came to realize this. 
The United States thus supported Ethiopia during the reign of Emperor Hailie 
Selassie in return for some base rights in what is now Eritrea, i.e. the “Kagnew 
Station”, the importance of which did, however, gradually decline. Partly as a 
result thereof, but also because of the Marxist and increasingly pro-Soviet 
leaning of the Derg in Addis Ababa under the dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam,24 
Washington gradually shifted its support to Somalia.25 The Soviet Union, in 
turn, supported the avowedly Afro-Marxist Siyad Barre regime in Somalia until 
around 1976 when it gradually shifted its support to the Derg in Ethiopia. The 
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Soviet ally (or even proxy) Cuba provided troops for the Derg’s defense against 
Somalia as well as, to some extent, its counterinsurgency campaigns against the 
various liberation movements—albeit significantly not for the struggle against 
the EPFL (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front), which Havana had previously 
supported.26  
 
The USSR already began its almost complete disengagement from all of Africa 
during the Gorbachev era,27 thereby removing the Cold War dynamics of 
alignment that had previously pushed the USA engage itself in the HoA. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Cold War the United States nevertheless became 
involved in Somalia in the form of a humanitarian intervention (vide infra). 
However, when this failed dismally, the USA disengaged almost as completely 
as Russia, not only from Somalia or the HoA subregion, but from Africa in 
general.28  
 
Throughout the Cold War period, the USA was on quite friendly terms with 
Sudan most of the time, albeit with a considerable cooling off of relations in the 
period when Nimeiri was “flirting” with the USSR, as well as after the 
assumption of power in Khartoum by the National Islamic Front (NIF) in 
1989.29 They did, however, maintain an engagement, e.g. with regard to the 
North-South conflict in which they at various stages sought to play the role of 
“honest broker.”30 What has hampered these praiseworthy efforts is, however, 
the “terror issue,” to which we shall now turn.  
 
 
3. The War on Terror and the HoA 
Many analysts have argued that the terrorist attacks against the USA on the 11th 
of September “changed everything.” This is surely an exaggeration, but there is 
little doubt that it did have a profound interest on the US attitude towards the 
rest of the world and that this was predestined to impact the world order, 
considering the US position in the unipolar world.31  
 
 
3.1 The Global War on Terror and the Horn of Africa  
Following the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States, US 
President Bush proclaimed a “war on terror.”  
 
On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our 
country (…) Our war on terror (…) will not end until every terrorist group of global 
reach has been found, stopped and defeated. (…) We will direct every resource at 
our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every 
instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary 
weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.32  
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The United Nations implicitly gave its approval when the Security Council in 
resolution 1368 (12th of September 2001) explicitly called terrorism a “threat to 
international peace and security” and referred to the “inherent right of self-
defense” endorsed by the UN Charter.33 This was echoed by NATO’s formal 
activation of the article five of the North Atlantic Charter, i.e. its collective 
defense clause.34 The proverbial opinio juris also seems to be in agreement on 
the permissibility of even anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defense against such 
threats, as this seems to be the only way of parrying them—e.g. by attacking 
such known bases of terrorists as had been established in Afghanistan. To wage 
a “war” on terror thus seems to be in conformity with international law in the 
sense of jus ad bellum, from which one can, on the other hand, neither conclude 
that the actual war is waged in conformity with the jus in bello criteria nor that it 
is wise to wage it.35  
 
Even considering the US tradition of declaring “wars” against such phenomena 
as drugs, crime, abortion, and even obesity, to declare war is still something 
special.36 It signifies that “the gloves come off” and that normal rules and 
behavioral constraints no longer apply. It thus meets the criteria of 
“securitization”—a term invented by Ole Wæver for the “speech act” of 
discursively constructing a problem as being of existential importance and 
extreme urgency, hence warranting a resort to “extraordinary measures.”37 It has 
thus served to legitimate a curtailment of civil liberties in the countries of the 
West and elsewhere in the name of national security against terrorism,38 but it 
has also served to legitimate military actions.  
 
The military element of the war on terror has been lumped together by the 
United States as “Operation Enduring Freedom,” (OEF),39 comprising several 
campaigns: the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan (OEF-Afghanistan) 
followed by the OEF-Philippines, the OEF-Pankisi Gorge and two which relate 
directly to Africa: The OEF-Trans Sahara is the military component of the 
somewhat broader Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (PSCI) which is a 
successor to what was called the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) from 2002 to 2004. 
The OEF-Horn of Africa is a follow-up to the EACTI (East Africa Counter-
Terrorism Initiative) program and includes the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn 
of Africa (CJTFHOA).40 While it remained, at the time of writing, subordinated 
to the US Central Command (CENTCOM), the decision had been taken to 
transfer the CJTF-HOA to the new Africa Command (AFRICOM) with initial 
operating capability (IOC) scheduled for October 2007 and expected to be fully 
operational a year later.41 The headquarters of CJTF-HOA is at Camp Lemonier 
in Djibouti. Its area of operations comprises the territories of Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Kenya, the Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen, and its mission is 
described as  
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… operations and training to assist host nations to combat terrorism in order to 
establish a secure environment and enable regional stability. The mission is focused 
on detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups 
operating in the region—denying safe havens, external support and material 
assistance for terrorist activity. CJTF-HOA counters the re-emergence of 
transnational terrorism in the region through civil-military operations and support of 
non-governmental organization operations, enhancing the long-term stability of the 
region.  
 
The activities it lists on its website are mainly civilian such as “providing clean 
water, functional schools, improved roadways and improved medical facilities,” 
i.e. it portrays itself as devoted to “winning hearts and minds” tasks.42 Besides 
this, however, it has also been involved in military operations, e.g. in Somalia, 
to which we shall return in due course.  
 
Even prior to these new initiatives, however, terrorism had impacted the US 
policy towards the Horn of Africa, especially as far as Sudan was concerned. 
Under the auspices of its “rougue states” doctrine43 the United States had kept an 
eye on especially Sudan because of its Islamist regime and supposed links with 
international terrorism,44 and in 1993 the country was first placed on the US 
State Department’s list of countries sponsoring international terrorism.45 
Following the terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es 
Salaam in August 1998,46 the United States even launched a missile attack 
against a the a-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, alleged to be a covert 
production site for chemical weapons (including the dreaded VX agent)—a 
mistake which was later (almost) admitted.47 In the wake of 11 September, 
Sudan pledged its support for the US.48 It has not yet, however, managed to be 
stricken from the US list of “state sponsors of terrorism,” even though in the 
most recent issue of the US State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism it 
is described as nothing less than “a strong partner in the War on Terror” which 
“aggressively pursued terrorist operations directly involving threats to U.S. 
interests and personnel in Sudan.”49  
 
 
3.2 The Horn of Africa: A Hotspot of Terrorism?  
It has become a commonplace in the US discourse, including the academic 
literature, that the Horn of Africa (or, more broadly, East Africa) is a particularly 
dangerous place, i.e. a hotspot of terrorism, particularly of the “jihadist” kind.50 
The arguments in favor of this view vary: Some allege that it is the weakness of 
the states in the region which make them particularly susceptible to terrorism 
and that, a fortiori, collapsed states such as Somalia will serve as staging areas, 
hiding places or operational bases for terrorist attacks.51 Others argue that 
extremist versions of Islam are making headway in the subregion, having 
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already become established in Sudan and now moving also to Somalia and 
Kenya, and that this is likely to produce more jihadist terrorism.52  
However, the available statistical data do not seem to really support the alarmist 
view of the threat.53 Table 1 is compiled as a complete listing of all the terrorists 
incidents in the region, based on the incident records in the “Terrorism 
Knowledge Base,” which is referred to as the authoritative database by the very 
same US Counterterrorism Office which has placed the spotlight on East 
Africa.54 It has taken 1998 as the starting year, for the simple reason that this 
was the first year with data for both international and domestic terrorism. 
However, 1998 was special because of two almost simultaneous incidents, i.e. 
the aforementioned attacks on the USA embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on the 
7th of August, which account for about one-third of the total fatalities for the 
entire period and almost ninety percent of the total recorded injuries. The 
analytical tables 2-4 have therefore also included totals excluding the 1998 
figures, i.e. totals for 1999-2005. All the categorizations are based on the present 
author’s interpretation of the “raw” incident and group descriptions in the 
database.  
 
The first observation is that neither the total number of terrorist incidents in the 
region, nor the numbers of deaths or injuries from terrorist attacks seem 
particularly alarming. Around eleven incidents on average per year with an 
annual death toll of less than hundred people for the HoA subregion as a whole 
(See Table 2). Secondly, as is apparent from Table 3, with the exception of the 
two incidents on the 7th of August 1998, most terrorism has been politically, 
rather than religiously motivated. Moreover, when religion has been the driving 
force, it has usually not been Islam but Christianity which has spurred the 
terrorists into action, albeit the particularly perverted and sectarian form of 
Christianity represented by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), operating 
against Uganda from bases in Sudan.55 Twenty times as many people have thus 
perished in terrorist attacks perpetrated by “Christians” than in ones launched by 
the dreaded Islamist terrorists of the Al Qaeda type. Thirdly, the terrorist risk 
seems to vary quite a lot from country to country as set out in Table 4. Uganda 
clearly comes out as the most terrorist-ridden of the eight, at least if the two 
embassy attacks are excluded. The table also reveals mainland Tanzania as a 
very secure country, as all the (small-scale) terrorist incidents have taken place 
on Zanzibar.  
 9
 
Table 1: Terrorist Incidents in East Africa, 1998-2005   
Country  Year  Date  Inc.  Inj.  Fat.  Perp.  Nature  Targ.  
Djibouti  2004  18/01 B  6  0  ?  ?  Train  
Eritrea  
2003 
2004 
2004  
10/08 
01/03 
24/05 
As 
B  
B  
1  
12  
50  
2  
3  
3  
EIJM 
EIJM 
?  
Isl  
Isl  
?  
Car  
Hotel  
Gov.  
Ethiopia  
1999 
1999 
2000 
2000 
2002 
2002 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004  
03/04 
13/11 
22/03 
17/08 
23/07 
11/09 
19/01 
20/03 
10/09 
26/09 
04/01 
05/04 
02/05 
24/06 
K  
B 
LM 
R 
B  
B  
M  
B  
AA  
B  
B  
AA  
AA  
B 
0  
1  
1  
0  
?  
38  
1  
12  
?  
9  
0  
0  
3  
?  
0  
2  
14  
6  
?  
1  
0  
0  
1  
2  
0  
0  
1  
?  
ONLF 
?  
OLF 
?  
OLF 
?  
?  
?  
?  
?  
? 
OLF 
OLF 
OLF  
Pol  
? 
Pol  
?  
Pol  
?  
?  
?  
?  
?  
?  
Pol  
Pol  
Pol  
Aid  
Train  
Kenyans  
El. mon. 
Vehicle  
Hotel  
?  
Hotel  
Aid  
Train  
Vehicle 
Education 
Business  
Gov.  
Kenya  
1998 
2002 
2002 
2002 
2002 
2003  
07/08 
28/11 
28/11 
18/12 
20/12 
08/03 
B/S 
R 
B/S 
B 
Ar 
B  
5,000  
0  
80  
0  
0  
0  
291  
0  
13  
0  
0  
0  
AQ 
AQ 
AQ  
?  
?  
?  
Isl  
Isl  
Isl  
? 
?  
?  
US Emb. 
Aircraft  
Hotel 
Discotec 
Discotec 
Mosque  
Somalia  
1998 
1999 
2001 
2003 
2004 
2004 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2005  
15/04 
19/09 
16/11 
28/07 
20/06 
04/10 
09/02 
17/02 
03/05 
11/07 
06/11 
K  
B 
AA 
B  
K 
As 
As 
B  
B 
AA 
AA  
?  
0  
9  
0  
?  
0  
0  
6  
38  
?  
?  
?  
0  
18  
0 
 ? 
 1  
1  
2  
15  
1  
5  
?  
ULA  
?  
?  
?  
?  
AI  
?  
?  
?  
?  
?  
Isl  
?  
?  
?  
?  
Isl  
?  
?  
?  
?  
Aid  
Oil pipeline 
Quran School 
Hotel  
NGO  
Aid worker 
Journ.  
Hotel  
Gov.  
NGO  
Gov. target  
1998 
1998 
1999 
2001 
2001 
2002 
2002  
02/07 
02/07 
18/02 
23/01 
05/08 
26/04 
15/10 
B  
B  
K  
B  
? 
AA 
H  
?  
?  
0  
0  
?  
0  
?  
?  
?  
4  
0  
?  
60  
?  
?  
? 
SPLA 
SPLA 
SPLA 
LRA  
?  
? 
?  
Pol  
Pol  
Pol 
Chr  
?  
Airport  
Power plant 
NGO  
Oil pipeline 
Oil pipeline 
Funeral Party 
Saudi aircraft  
2005  05/7  AA  0  5  LRA  Chr  Vehicle  
2005  05/7  AA  11  6  LRA  Chr  NGO  
Sudan  
2005  05/11 AA  1  1  LRA  Chr  Air worker  
Tanzania  1998  07/08 B/S  77  10  AQ  Isl  US Emb.  
Tanzania 
(Zanzibar)  
1999 
2004 
2004 
2000  
23/12 
20/03 
20/03 
12/11 
B  
B  
B  
B  
0  
0  
0  
1  
0  
0  
0  
0  
?  
?  
?  
?  
?  
?  
?  
?  
Beer depot 
Restaurant 
Gov.  
Gov.  
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Uganda  
1998 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2004 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2005  
04/04 
04/04 
12/07 
18/07 
25/08 
27/11 
01/03 
01/03 
10/04 
11/04 
14/04 
24/04 
06/05 
07/05 
30/05 
04/05 
01/10 
09/10 
14/03 
16/03 
07/07 
24/07 
01/09 
13/10 
18/11 
01/02 
21/02 
05/02 
14/04 
18/04 
17/05 
20/12 
19/01 
23/02 
26/02 
09/03 
15/03 
26/03 
05/05 
05/05 
10/07 
18/11 
21/11 
13/12 
B  
B  
B  
B  
B 
AA 
B  
K  
B  
B  
B  
B  
B  
B  
B  
K 
As 
B  
B  
B  
B  
K 
Am 
AA 
AA 
AA 
B 
AA 
AA 
K 
AA 
AA 
As 
AA 
Ae 
AA 
AA 
K 
AA 
AA 
AA 
AA 
AA 
AA  
2  
5  
3  
?  
6  
17  
4  
0  
4  
13  
35  
16  
1  
10 
12 
 0  
?  
60  
3  
4  
13  
?  
?  
20  
?  
?  
60  
50 
8  
0  
10  
1  
0  
7  
8  
16  
7  
13  
?  
14  
?  
?  
5  
?  
0  
2  
1  
?  
30  
16  
0  
8  
0  
2  
4  
5  
0  
1  
2  
0  
1  
9  
2  
1  
1  
?  
22  
22  
12  
8  
239  
47  
13  
0  
7  
2  
1  
1  
1  
6  
2  
?  
4  
10  
14  
5  
12  
8  
?  
?  
?  
? 
NALU 
LRA  
?  
IH  
?  
?  
?  
?  
?  
? 
AMM 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA  
?  
?  
?  
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA 
LRA  
?  
?  
?  
?  
Pol 
Chr  
?  
Pol  
?  
?  
?  
?  
?  
?  
Isl  
Chr 
Chr 
Chr  
?  
?  
?  
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr 
Chr  
Hotel  
Hotel 
Restaurant 
Civilians  
Bus  
Aid 
Restaurant 
Tourists  
Taxi park  
Taxi park 
Restaurant 
Stadium 
Civilians 
Civilians 
Restaurant 
Rel.  
Rel.  
Disco 
Civilians 
Civilians 
Civilians  
Gov.  
Vehicle 
Restaurant 
Civilians 
Civilians 
Refugees 
Refugees 
Vehicle  
Rel.  
Vehicles 
Vehicle  
MP  
Civilians 
Civilians 
Civilians 
Civilians 
Civilians 
Vehicle 
IDPs  
Civilians 
Vehicle 
Vehicle 
Vehicle  
Legend: AA: Armed Attack; AI: Al-Islah; Am: Ambush; AMM: Ahmadiya Muslim 
Mission; AQ: Al Qaeda; Ar: Arson; As: Assass; B: Bomb; C: Christian; EIJM; Eritrean 
Islamic Jihad Movement; H: Hijacking; I: Islamist; IH: Interahamwe; K: Kidnapping; LM: 
Land Mine; LRA: Lord’s Resistance Army; M: Mortar; NALU: National Army for the 
Liberation of Uganda; OLF: Oromo Liberation Front; ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation 
Front; P: Political; R: Rocket; S: Suicide attack; SPLA: Sudan People's Liberation Army; 
Tanz(Z): Tanzania (Zanzibar); ULA: Ummah Liberation Army  
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Table 2: Terrorism in East Africa  
Year  Inc.  Inj.  Fat.  
1998  
1999  
2000  
2001  
2002  
2003  
2004  
2005  
11 
14  
6  
6  
9  
10 
18 
20  
5,110 
96  
62 
 29 
118 
43 
200 
126  
350  
28  
30  
22  
74  
61  
324 
100  
Av. 1998-2005  11.8 723.0  123.7  
Av. 1999-2005  11.9 96.3  91.3  
Legend: Inc: Incidents; Inj: Injuries; Fat: 
Fatalities; Av: Annual Average  
 
Table 3: Terrorism by Motivation  
Motive  Inc.  Inj.  Fat.  
Unknown 
Political 
Christian 
Islam  
43 
11 
32 
8  
284 
10 
308 
105  
76  
57  
534  
21  
Emb. attacks  2  5,077  301  
 
 
It thus seems that the threat from (what the West calls) terrorism, and even more 
so that of Islamic terrorism, is blown completely out of proportion as far as East 
Africa and the HoA is concerned. This may not only be the West’s fault, as it 
may also be in the interest of governments in the region to exaggerate the threat. 
First of all, positioning themselves as the allies of the United States in its global 
“war on terror” is likely to gain them some much needed goodwill. Secondly, it 
also makes them eligible for support from the EACTI pool, e.g. for military or 
police upgrading programs. Thirdly, and more problematically, it may allow 
governments to label their opponents terrorists, thereby allowing them to resort 
to “extraordinary measures” to defeat them.  
 
Even though HoA is not yet a terrorist hotspot—and especially not one of 
Islamist terrorism—one cannot rule out that it may become one in the future. In 
this connection, concerns have been raised about the alleged spread of particular 
forms of Islam in the subregion.56 Others have, however, pointed out that the 
predominant forms of Islam throughout the region (mainly various forms of 
Sufism) have been quite moderate and apolitical.57 Even though there have 
surely been attempts at Islamization and at garnering popular support for 
“jihadism,” e.g. using various Islamic charities and NGOs as instruments, these 
have generally been unsuccessfull.58 The only country where Islamism ever 
really established itself was Sudan and even here, the tide seems to have turned, 
e.g. with the split between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood of Al 
Turabi.59 Whether something similar might have happened, or been about the 
Table 4: Terrorism by Country  
Country  Inc.  Inj.  Fat.  
Dibouti  
Eritrea  
Ethiopia  
Kenya (A) 
Kenya (B) 
Somalia  
Sudan Tanzania 
(A) Tanzania 
(B) Tanzania 
(C) Tanzania 
(D) Uganda  
1  
3  
15  
6  
5  
11  
10  
5  
4  
0  
4  
44  
6  
63 
191 
5,080 
80  
53  
12  
78  
1  
0  
1  
427  
0  
8  
43  
304  
13  
43  
76  
10  
0  
0 
0  
521  
Legend:  Inc: Incidents; Inj: Injuries; Fat: 
Fatalities; (Kenya and Tanzania) A: Total; 
B): without embassy bombings; (Tanzania) 
C: Mainland; D: only Zanzibar  
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happen, in Somalia is the question to which we shall now turn in a rather 
elaborate case study of this troubled country.  
 
 
4. Case Study: Somalia: A breeding Ground for Terrorists? 
Since 9/11 Somalia has attracted growing attention as allegedly one of the most 
likely breeding grounds for terrorism. The actions taken by the United States 
and its allies (mainly Ethiopia) in the years 2006-07 seem to have pushed this 
troubled country over the edge, plunging it back into chaos. As a background to 
the account and analysis of these recent events, a brief account of the historical 
background is provided , highlighting some of the recurrent themes which also 
play a role today—nationalism and irredentism, clanism, various “state 
pathologies,” the economy and  religion.  
 
 
4.1 Somali Nationalism  
The fact that the Somali are ethnically homogenous may help explain their 
strong sense of nationhood, notwithstanding the fact that there has never been a 
state to serve as a superstructure on the national community. In fact the closest 
the Somali ever came to being united in one state-like political structure was 
during the aforementioned short-lived Italian empire in East Africa. It should 
therefore come as no surprise that the lack of correspondence between the 
“imagined community” of the Somali nation and the political realities have 
taken the form of a nationalism which has featured elements of both 
secessionism and irredentism—the former because members of the Somali 
nation were “trapped” in multinational states such as Ethiopia or Kenya, and the 
latter because the nation was not united in one state.  
 
Partly because of the country’s location it was bound to draw the attention of 
both the Arabs60 and later the Europeans, but also that of the rulers of the most 
state-like polity in Africa, the cohesive and expansive Ethiopia. Hence the 
division between the Ethiopia and the three European powers France, Italy and 
Great Britain. The latter controlled both the northern parts, governed as a 
separate entity, and the southern-most parts, administered as part of Kenya, 
whereas France controlled the present Djibouti, the Italians the eastern parts and 
Ethiopia the north-western parts of the lands populated by Somali nationals.   
 
Considering the strong sense of nationhood among the 
Somali, it was almost inevitable that independent 
Somalia was born with an irredentist agenda. Indeed, the 
irredentist aspirations were clearly depicted in the flag of 
the new republic, in which the five points of the star 
represent the components of the ideal Somalia, 
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comprising the present Djibouti, the Republic of Somalia (de facto bifurcated at 
present into Somalia and Somaliland), the Northeastern part of Kenya and what 
used to be called the Ogaden province of Ethiopia, now called the Somali 
Regional State.61 Unsurprisingly, this nationalist project led to wars, first the 
low-key “Shifta war” with Kenya (1963-1968)62 and then the “Ogaden War” 
with Ethiopia (1977-78)—in both cases commencing with Somali support for 
indigenous, secessionist rebel movements.63 The latter war might be seen as a 
consequence of the pursuit by both sides of “antithetical security goals” 
stemming from particular conceptions of statehood, as argued by Terrence 
Lyons:  
 
Ethiopia’s security has been predicated on maintaining territorial integrity and 
building cohesion for its multinational population. This required maintaining control 
of the Ogaden. Somalia’s security goals have aimed at creating a nation-state that 
incorporated the Somalis living in the Ogaden. Actions by either of these states in 
pursuit of their conception of security therefore increased the perceived insecurity of 
the other.64  
 
Somali irredentism also goes a long way towards explaining the somewhat 
ambivalent attitude of both Kenya and Ethiopia towards Somalia even today—as 
well as Somali sensitivity towards any Ethiopian interference in its domestic 
affairs. Seen from Nairobi or, even more so, Addis Ababa, the ideal Somalia is 
one that is just strong and cohesive enough to be able to feed and care for its 
citizens, lest they end up as refugees across the border, but not strong enough to 
act on its latent irredentist national agenda—or, even better, one that is governed 
by a regime which is totally dependent for its remaining in power on the support 
from Ethiopia, as is the case of the present Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG), to which we shall return in due course. During the first phase of the  
Somali civil war, Ethiopia thus interfered by supporting various armed factions 
such as the DFSS (Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia) and the SNM 
(Somali National Movement),65 just as the government in Addis Ababa has done 
in the recent crisis.  
 
Viewed from Somalia, any interference from Ethiopia is quite understandably 
interpreted as attempts to curb the legitimate aspirations of the Somali nation, 
both in Somalia itself and in the Somali-majority parts of Ethiopia, with the 
inhabitants of which the Somalis feel a deep sense of community. Even though it 
probably helps that the post-Mengistu Ethiopian constitution with its “ethnic 
federalism” grants greater autonomy to the Somali inhabitants than any previous 
regime, it is not without problems, inter alia because it formally allows the 
constituent parts to secede from the federation.66 This is likely to make the 
government in Addis Ababa even more concerned about any secessionist 
aspirations and any Somali support for such movements, such as the WSLF 
(Western Somali Liberation Front) and its successors in the Ogaden region of 
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Ethiopia. Even in the recent past, there has indeed been such support—viewed 
by Ethiopia as Somali interference in its internal affairs—including some 
terrorist attacks in Ethiopia itself  in the 1990s perpetrated by the group Al-
Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), to which we shall return below. At the time it 
provoked an Ethiopian military intervention which, in turn, merely exacerbated 
anti-Ethiopian sentiments in Somalia.67  
 
Had the Somali flag been designed today, it might have featured a sixth point, 
symbolizing yet another part of the Somali nation, i.e. the diaspora, which is 
scattered across the world.68 Various conflict theories, including the fashionable 
and influential one of Paul Collier, have found that the presence of diasporas in 
rich countries tends to intensify and prolong armed conflicts in the respective 
countries origin of these diasporas.69 The links are probably not nearly as clear 
as claimed by Collier, as others have pointed to the occasional peace-promoting 
potential of diasporas, but it is probably fair to say that large diasporas add an 
element of unpredictability to armed conflicts, as they represent actors who are 
both involved in the conflict and detached from its consequences.70  
 
The War on Terror has further complicated matters. Regardless of whether 
Collier’s thesis is true or not, or whether his findings can simply be translated 
into the thesis that diasporas tend to support terrorism, the United States seems 
to believe in both hypotheses. Washington thus harbors strong suspicions that at 
least some members of such diasporas contribute to financing terrorism, either 
by sending remittances to relatives in Somalia who may, in turn, support 
terrorism or by directly siphoning off funds to Al Qaeda and other terrorist 
groups from the remittance flow. The USA therefore in November 2001 cracked 
down on the Al Barakaat bank, which was the main source of remittances sent to 
the Somali civilians, transferring far greater funds than total international 
humanitarian aid, via a hawala system.71 Needless to say, this move did not 
really improve the already strained relationship between the United States and 
the suffering civilian population of Somalia in desperate need of these funds. 
Fortunately, the informal banking sector in Somalia proved resilient and 
diversified enough to find other avenues for remittance transfers, thereby 
averting the humanitarian disaster that would otherwise have been inevitable.72  
 
 
4.2 Identities and Clans  
Even though the Somali are arguably one of Africa’s oldest and most 
homogenous nations, both ethnically and in terms of religion and customs (and 
with a unifying myth of origin based on Islam) the nation has long been divided 
according to other criteria, mainly those of kinship in the form of clans, 
previously often referred to as tribes. The clans have their origins in lineage, the 
Somali tracing their decent through their male lineages many generations back, 
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thus defining their identity and loyalties according to a genealogy which may be 
partly mythical, as with the myth of descent from Arabian families, perhaps 
even from the prophet himself.73  
 
The subdivision of the nation into clans forms a complex picture of “major 
clans” (sometimes referred to as “clan families”), (minor) clans and sub-clans as 
depicted in Chart 1.74 Clan families tend to congregate in different parts of the 
country: Dir in enclaves along the coast in the south as well as in the border 
region between the present Somaliland and Djibouti; Isaaq in the Somaliland 
and parts of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia; Darood in the north as well as in the 
frontier region with Kenya; Hawyie in the middle parts, including the area 
around Mogadishu; and Rewin south of Mogadishu as well as parts of Ogaden 
(see Fig. 1).75 Even though they thus tend to congregate territorially, each clan is 
scattered, not only across the country but also among adjacent states, to which 
should be added the aforementioned diaspora.  
 
The clan structure further has some correlation with territory, in the sense that 
nomadic herding units, enjoying usufructural rights to particular pastures and 
wells, usually consist of agnatic groups belonging to the same clan.76 The fact 
that pasture and water are scarce throughout Somalia, and therefore often fought 
over, has made these lineage-based groups essential units for self-help and thus 
for survival in an inhospitable environment. Unsurprisingly, they have often 
resorted to violence in their struggle against each other.77 There is thus nothing 
“primitive” or irrational about them, and that these clan loyalties have also been 
manifested in armed clan militias and inter-clan strife is thus entirely 
understandable, however deplorable.  
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According to Issa-Salwe, “[T]he Somali inter-clan conflict is centered on feuds 
as it aims to injure or eliminate the hostile clan, to seek revenge, to reverse 
wrongs, and to protect its rights over resources.”78 One might even speak of a 
“security dilemma of clan rivalry” as argued by David Laitin:  
 
First, for all nomadic groups in a battle against unforgiving nature, every grazing 
area, every watering hole, is vital for survival. Increased measures by any clan to 
enhance security must therefore be seen by leaders of other clans as threatening their 
physical survival. The security dilemma can thus be seen as a permanent condition 
of life in the Somali bush. Second, as Siyaad seeded clan warfare through strategic 
distribution of weapons he received as foreign aid, he surely threatened the survival 
of enemy clans, who themselves were impelled to seek comparable arms to secure 
their future. Third, after the collapse of the Siyaad regime in 1991, all clans feared 
for their futures if an enemy clan captured the reins of power. Surely they armed 
themselves in part because of the disastrous potential consequences for their security 
of not arming.79  
 
Attempts at separating the state from the clan structure have been made in the 
past, e.g. under the Barre regime, which passed legislation forbidding the use of 
clan names for political parties—but all alleged no-clan (or anti-clan) initiatives 
have, on closer analyses, revealed themselves as tactical or strategic moves in 
the inter-clan struggle.80  
 
 
4.3 State Weakness, Collapse and Attempted Reconstruction  
Not only was the Somali state born irredentist, it was also born weak. Upon 
independence-cum-unification in 1961, the formal political dispensation was 
democratic, but actual power was primarily distributed on the basis of kinship.81  
 
 
4.3.1 The Siyad Barre Era 
The second and last round of democratic elections took place in 1969 in which 
no less than 64 parties competed, yet without being able to topple the incumbent 
Somali Youth League,82 and on the 15th of October the same year, the President 
Shermanke was assassinated and the military took over. This brought to power a 
military junta led by General Siyad Barre, who almost immediately suspended 
the constitution, closed parliament and banned all political parties, placing a 
Supreme Revolutionary Council in charge of the state. which was in 1976 
superseded by a one-party system based on the Somali Socialist Revolutionary 
Party (SSRP).83  
 
What is today commonly referred to as “the Siyad Barre era” (with distinctly 
pejorative connotations) might in fact be broken down into at least two main 
periods: The period from the coup in 1969 until the Ogaden War in 1977/78 was 
characterized by socio-cultural experiments, albeit guided by a (mainly Chinese-
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inspired) “scientific socialism.”84 The Ogaden War seriously weakened the 
regime. Even though an attempted military coup in 1978 was quelled, the 
domestic strength of the regime steadily weakened and the opposition gained 
strength, also spurred by the unpopular introduction of conscription in 1984.85 
After the war the regime went through a transformation, which Hussein Adam 
has aptly described as autocracy (197886) and tyranny (1987-1991).86 Not only 
did the regime become more despotic, but it also became increasingly infected 
by clanism, notwithstanding its initial attempts at banning clanism and 
tribalism—to the point of making clanism a capital offence.87 Now the positions 
of real power were primarily filled with members of the Marrehaan, Ogaadeen 
and Dulbahante clans (hence the derogatory term “MOD rule”) combined with 
systematic attempts at eliminating the elites of other clans.88 The opposition, in 
its turn, also increasingly came to rely on clans—a trend which was reinforced 
by the mounting economic crisis, which was partly caused, and certainly 
exacerbated, by the high military expenditures after the Ogagen War. It 
weakened state structures and made people turn to their clan networks for 
support and security.  
 
The Ogaden War and its aftermath thus partly explains the rise of nationalist and 
gradually secessionist movements in what is today (Isaaq-dominated) 
Somaliland, led by the Somali National Movement (SNM), which was founded 
in 1981 and supported by Ethiopia. A similar development occurred, at about the 
same time, in the Mijerteen-dominated north-east, where the Somali Salvation 
Democratic Front (SSDF) launched a struggle against the central government, 
thus laying the groundworks for what is today the semi-autonomous status of 
Puntland.89 Other national movements were created amongst the Somali 
diaspora, both in the Arab countries and in Western Europe, all of them roughly 
following clan boundaries. The USC (United Somali Congress) was thus based 
in Rome and mainly “represented” the Hawiye clan, including the subsequently 
(perhaps unfairly) notorious Mohammed Aideed. The Manifesto Initiative, in its 
turn, was somewhat broader, but also represented mainly the Hawiye and 
Darood clans, whereas the SPM (Somali Patriotic Movements) stemmed 
primarily from the Ogaden. Most of the several oppositional factions were thus 
based on clans, a simplified picture of which is presented in Table 5. A number 
of (mostly short-lived) alliances were forged between the various factions, e.g. 
between the USC, SDM, SSNM and SPM, and in 1990 agreement was reached 
on joint operations against Barre.90  
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After a protracted period of growing weakness and mounting turmoil, the 
opposition movements finally succeeded in deposing Siyad Barre in 1991. 
Following the fall of Siyad Barre, the Manifesto Group set up an interim 
government with Ali Mahdi Mohamed as interim president, but this was almost 
immediately followed by a split between (and within) the various rebel groups. 
The main protagonists were General Aideed and his Habr Abgal clan and the 
self-appointed president and his Abgal clan. The two groups effectively 
established control over the southern and northern parts of the city, respectively, 
divided by a so-called “green line”.  
 
 
4.3.2 Civil War, State Collapse and UN Intervention 
What followed was an extraordinarily messy civil war, featuring extensive inter-
clan fighting and sheer banditry, combined with widespread looting, also of the 
food and other aid provided by the relief agencies.91 By March 1992 Mogadishu 
had thus been nearly deserted, at least 300,000 people had died of hunger and 
related diseases, and the direct death toll from the fighting was around 44,000. 
The severe famine suffered by the civilian population (also partly caused by a 
drought) was finally “discovered” by the international media.92 This belated 
media coverage brought the suffering of the civilian population to the attention 
of the proverbial “international community” with an implicit imperative to act—
albeit initially mainly in terms of food aid. Not only did most of this only arrive 
after the famine had run its course, but it may arguably even have exacerbated 
the problems by contributing to the emergent “war economy”, upon which the 
militias thrived.93  
 
The international community, i.e. the UN with the United States as lead nation 
both politically and militarily, also staged a military intervention, officially 
mandated as a peacekeeping operation, even though there was no peace to keep. 
More appropriately it has been referred to as a humanitarian intervention, i.e. an 
attempt at “saving strangers.”94 As there seems to have been no other strategic or 
economic interests in Somalia—not even the geopolitical imperatives of the 
Cold Wars which had just come to an end—it seems reasonable to accept the 
humanitarian motive as the primary one in addition to which the United States 
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surely also had to accept the “noblesse oblige logic.” For the only remaining 
superpower laying claim to hegemonic position in a “new world order” 
characterized by human rights concerns and the promotion of democracy and 
other western values, there are situations where action is obviously needed and 
where the hegemon is obliged to take the lead.95  
 
Even though the two multilateral UN missions (UNOSOM-1 and -2) as well as 
the unilateral US missions UNITAF were primarily motivated by humanitarian 
concerns, their actual accomplishments fell far short of mitigating human 
suffering. In fact, according to most analyses they probably did more harm than 
good96 partly because of the US penchant for Manichaean thinking,97 
categorizing groups and individuals as good or evil rather than recognizing the 
predominance of different shades of gray. In the role as villain the United States 
cast one of the rivaling warlords, Mohammed Aideed, partly because of his 
refusal to sign an agreement coming out of talks in Addis Ababa in January and 
March 1993.98 His reputation as (what would today be called) a “spoiler”99 and 
the “enemy number one” of the United States was reinforced when his forces in 
June 1993 ambushed a number of UN peacekeepers which started almost a chain 
reaction. The United States persuaded the UN to destroy Aideed’s radio stations, 
an attempt which on the 5th of June 1993 led to a serious firefight between 
Pakistani UNOSOM troops and Somali militiamen who, according to a 
subsequent UN investigation, belonged to Aideed’s faction. In revenge of the 
loss of 24 UN troops in this skirmish,100 the Security Council passed a resolution 
(UNSCR 837) authorizing the use of force to apprehend the culprits, albeit not 
explicitly naming Aideed or even his USC.101 This United States placed a prize 
of US$25,000 on Aideed’s head, thus “acting in an idiom more suited to the 
Wild West than the complex task of peace and security building in Somalia” (as 
aptly put by Nicholas Wheeler)102 and effectively transformed at least the US 
parts of what should have been an impartial peacekeeping operation into a 
combat mission against an identified target.103 According to two senior US 
officials in situ (writing two years later), the designation of Aideed as an enemy 
was “devastating, for Somalis and the peacekeepers, for U.S. foreign policy, and 
for peacekeeping itself”.104  
 
The United States deployed its Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in pursuit of the 
evasive Aideed, but in the process of doing so caused substantial “collateral” 
damage—as did other contributors to UNOSOM-II. On one occasion, Pakistani 
UNOSOM troops fired into a crowd, killing twenty civilians; on another rocket 
fire was opened at a hospital, killing nine patients; and on the 12th of July, the 
QRF launched an air and missile attack (code-named “Operation Michigan”) 
against a meeting of clan elders from the Habr-Gedir clan, employing no less 
than sixteen TOW missiles and more than 2,000 rounds of cannon fire, and 
killing at least 54 of the elders—but not Aideed.105 Subsequently, the US 
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(against the advice of then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin 
Powell)106 deployed 400 Rangers and some Delta Force commandos to conduct 
raids against Aideed’s forces, killing “hundreds of Somalis” in the estimate of 
Trevor Findlay, as the raids took place in densely populated areas.107 On the 3rd 
of October, US Rangers found themselves in a fire-fight with Somalis (who may 
or may not have belonged to Aideed’s forces) and eighteen were killed along 
with between 300 and a thousand Somali casualties (who were almost 
immediately forgotten) in the incident behind the book and movie Black Hawk 
Down. 108  
 
The fact that the bodies of the dead soldiers were not treated with dignity, but 
that one corpse was stripped naked and dragged through the streets constituted a 
serious humiliation of the United States. Washington promptly reacted with a 
proclamation (7 October) by President Clinton that the US would begin a 
withdrawal of its forces and be out by 31 March 1994, come what may. 
Henceforth the US troops were almost entirely preoccupied with self-defense, 
and the hunt for Aideed was abandoned.109 By March 1994, all US and most 
European forces had been withdrawn,110 and the UN Security Council in 
UNSCR 897 (4 February 1994) announced an unconditional complete 
withdrawal by March 1995, the last remaining forces being “extracted” with 
some US and European assistance from 28th of  February to the 3rd of  March 
1995.111  
 
Not only did this chain of events exhibit an uncanny resemblance to the events 
in 2006, when the United States had merely substituted the hunt for terrorists 
(vide infra) for the hunt for Aideed. There is also a direct link between the two, 
at least as far as myth-building is concerned. Paradoxically, both the United 
States and Osama bin Laden have alleged that the latter’s Al Qaeda was behind 
the “Black Hawk down” incident, whereas most analysts dismiss this as highly 
unlikely and unsubstantiated by any evidence.112 Even the official 9/11 
Commission Report is rather equivocal on the issue, claiming merely that AQ 
sent weapons to unspecified Somali warlords as well as “scores of trainers” 
some of whom “were later heard boasting that their assistance led to the October 
2003 shoot down.” A recent report published by the Westpoint military academy 
on the basis of declassified papers, likewise dismisses the claim, pointing to the 
serious difficulties Al Qaeda operatives dispatched to the country had in their 
relations with the Somali.113  
 
 
4.3.3. Statelessness and attempted State-building 
Ever since the collapse of the Somali state, more than a dozen different attempts 
have been made at state reconstruction114 of which the two most recent have 
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produced the TNG (Transitional National Government) of the year 2000 and its 
successor, the TFG (Transitional Federal Government) of 2004.  
 
The TNG came out of a conference was held in Arta in Djibouti, where 2,000 
delegates elected a 245-man Transitional National Assembly (TNA), on a clan 
basis. This in turn elected a transitional President, Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, 
who appointed an interim Prime Minister, Ali Khalif Galaydh. This Transitional 
National Government (TNG) established in August 2000, remained in power 
until it was toppled by a vote of no-confidence in October 2001. However, its 
actual control extended to only half of the capital and small enclaves in the 
interior, and it was never able to ensure the personal security of its members, as 
several members of the TNG were assassinated. By 2003 the TNG had collapsed 
in all but name, even though it had called upon former SNA (Somali National 
Army) troops for protection.115 Despite its weakness, however, as representative 
of this “virtual state” the TNG’s President Abdiqasim attended UN Millennium 
Summit, thus achieving some de facto recognition by the UN of his “one-man 
government still in exile”, which was formalized on the 1st of November 2001. 
From the UN, he proceeded to summits in the Arab League, OIC and IGAD, 
likewise achieving de facto recognition, and the TNG was recognized de jure by 
the OAU in December 2000.116  
 
The TNG seems also to have tried to exploit the US-proclaimed “war against 
terrorism”.117 As early as September 2001 it thus established a “national anti-
terrorism task force,” undoubtedly in the hope that this would gain it some 
American sympathy and eventually perhaps even recognition. Despite its 
exploitation of the AIAI threat, some observers have alleged that the AIAI had 
strong links to the TNG, with about a dozen MPs in the transitional parliament 
affiliated with it;118 while others have pointed to the TMG’s obvious inability to 
play any active role in counter-terrorism: “Since the TNG has yet to police its 
own capital city, the notion that it will combat terrorist cells in the country as a 
whole is not to be taken seriously”, as succinctly put by Ken Menkhaus.119  
 
In parallel with the demise of the TNG ran the so-called “Eldoret process”, 
commencing with a gathering of Somali political leaders in October 2002 in 
Kenyan town Eldoret, under the auspices of IGAD. On the 7th of October the 
Eldoret Declaration on “Cessation of Hostilities and the Structure and Principles 
of the Somali National Reconciliation Process” was adopted. Subsequently, the 
signatories reconstituted themselves as a “Leaders’ Committee”. In 2003, the 
process was continued, now under the leadership of the new IGAD envoy, 
Kenyan Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, and relocated to Mbagathi outside 
Nairobi.120 By then, however, what had begun as a promising process had, 
according to the International Crisis Group, evolved toward “an unimaginative 
‘cake-cutting’ exercise in power-sharing by an un-elected and only partially 
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representative political elite that threatens to repeat the history of earlier failed 
initiatives”.121 Regional rivalry between, on the one side, Ethiopia, sponsoring 
the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC) and, on the other 
side, Djibouti and Arab countries, supporting the TNG, did not help at all.  
 
Nevertheless, in September 2003 agreement was reached on a draft transitional 
charter envisaging a federalist political dispensation, and dominated by the 
SRRC and Ethiopia’s closest ally in Somalia (in fact in semi-autonomous 
Puntland) Abdulah Yusuf. While a number of other clans were co-opted into the 
agreement, others were excluded. This was followed in the autumn of 2004 by 
the establishment (on the basis of clan-quotas) of a transitional federal 
parliament (TFP) which on the 10th of October elected Yusuf interim president 
of the TFG. Three weeks after his inauguration, he appointed Ali Mohamed 
Geedi for Prime Minister, who in turn was charged with appointing a cabinet. Its 
very size—comprising three deputy PMs, 33 minister, 34 deputy ministers and 8 
state ministers—is evidence of its being based on co-optation of potential rivals. 
That this did not ensure its representatively was demonstrated when the TPF 
with 153 out of 275 votes passed a motion of no-confidence, which only made 
the president dissolve the TFP whilst retaining Geedi as the PM.122  
 
The main problem with the TFI (transitional federal institutions) has, however, 
been that they have exerted absolutely no actual control over the country which 
they are ostensibly governing. Even though leading members of most of the 
armed factions were represented in the cabinet, the TFG did not find the 
situation in Somalia safe enough for it to relocate from Kenya without foreign 
protection. Having appealed in vain to both the UN and the AU for a protection 
force of 20,000 troops, the TFG eventually settled for Ethiopian armed 
protection allowing it to move its headquarters to Somalia, albeit not to the 
capital, Mogadishu, but to Baidoa in January 2006—but still denying the 
presence of any Ethiopian troops.123  
 
This growing reliance on the arch-enemy was probably the main reason for the 
internal disagreements within the TFI, several members of the cabinet resigning 
in March 2005, mainly the so-called “Mogadishu group,” most belonging to the 
Hawiye clan. The TFG made some attempts at creating an army, partly in 
contravention of the UN-imposed arms embargo which remains in force,124 but 
merely implemented a certain redeployment of militias from Puntland to the 
central parts. In late December 2006 and early January 2007, however, the TFG 
was finally installed in Mogadishu, yet only as a result of what was in reality 
(albeit not formally) an Ethiopian invasion. We shall return to these dramatic 
events in due course.   
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Whereas state reconstruction has thus failed in the southern parts of Somalia, it 
has fared somewhat better in Puntland and to some extent even in the inter-
riverine region, where a governing authority has emerged in the form of a 
“Digil-Mirifle clan authority”, created through consecutive conferences (in 1993 
and 1995 in Bonka and Rewin, respectively). It is based on a bicameral system, 
featuring a House of Representatives and a House of Elders, and has 
promulgated recommendations for a future status as a regional state within a 
looser Somali federation. This is also the status demanded by the regional 
authorities in Puntland, where in 1997 a National Salvation Council established 
itself as a de facto state authority, based on a “constitution” adopted by a 
constitutional conference in 1998. The Puntland regional state comprises the 
Bari, Nugal and North Mudug provinces and is fairly homogenous 
demographically, most of the population belonging to the Majerteen clan (part 
of the Darood clan family). The state was officially proclaimed in July 1998, 
when a constitution was adopted and a president and prime minister appointed. 
Notwithstanding a dispute with Somaliland over the districts Sanaag and Sool, 
Puntland remained fairly stable compared with the south.125  
 
 
4.4 Coping without a State  
Societies are remarkably resilient in the face of hardships and one such as 
Somalia perhaps more than most. In the absence of a functioning political 
system to manage societal relations, other societal institutions are likely to take 
charge, simply because life must go on and people are forced to cope as best 
they can, even under the most dreadful conditions.  
 
As far as law and order are concerned, various non-state mechanisms have taken 
the place of the state, including the diya system, offering a modicum of order via 
mutual deterrence among clans, and bringing into play traditional institutions 
such as the clan elders.126 Moreover, Islamic (“shari’a”) courts have largely 
taken over from the defunct formal judiciary (vide infra) and Islamic charities 
are filling in for the non-existent social welfare system (vide supra). Most such 
arrangement have merely a local scope and they are often clan-based, thereby 
excluding people living beyond the core area of their respective clan as well as 
the small minorities who do not belong to clans.127 Nevertheless, it is certainly 
better than nothing, and westerners (including the present author) should beware 
of their/our ethnocentric biases, blinding them/us to forms of order radically 
different from the state-based ones to which we are accustomed as argued in a 
controversial work by Patrick Chabal and  Jean-Pascal Daloz.128  
 
As far as the economy is concerned, in the absence of a state, other societal 
institutions will usually take charge of “the authoritative allocation of values for 
a society,”129 i.e. of determining “who gets what, when and how.” Indeed, 
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Somalia’s stateless economy might be seen as simply following the prescriptions 
of economic liberalism—including the controversial “Washington 
Consensus”—only to greater extremes than almost any other country and with 
Adam Smith’s proverbial “invisible hand” in a leading role.130 What makes this 
problematic is, of course, that Somalia was born with a legacy of poverty and a 
with very backward economy, depending mainly on farming in the north-west 
and south and pastoralism in the central and northern regions, with fishing, 
leather works and trading also accounting for large shares of GDP as well as of 
employment.131 Moreover, the country is extremely vulnerable to climatic 
fluctuations as well as to such “coincidents” as outbreaks of rinderpest or rift 
valley fever, either in Somalia itself or in neighboring countries. This has 
typically lead to the imposition by Saudi Arabia and other major trading partners 
of occasional bans on livestock imports from Somalia (e.g. in 1983 and 2000), 
which have severely disrupted the entire economy.132  
 
Successive governments have done little to improve the situation, but have 
tended to exacerbate rather than solve the problems. Surely, the civil war had 
extremely destructive effects on the economy, as commerce was superseded by 
looting—and where even the mere presence of the peacekeepers contributed to 
distorting the economy.133 However, when the fighting had peaked the economy 
has actually benefitted from state collapse, i.e. that “as far as economic welfare 
is concerned, absence of government has proven to be better than the repressive 
institutions and improper policies if Barre’ government”, as claimed by Jamil 
Mubarak.134 It allowed for a revival of the private sector, especially the (today 
almost all-encompassing) informal economy, which developed under Siyad, but 
which has also provided a fall-back system after state collapse. Not only has the 
(at least parts of) the economy managed to “muddle through”, with most 
economic transactions now being based on clientilistic networks, i.e. on the 
basis of social rather than legal contracts. There have also been localized and 
rather chaotic economic booms, e.g. in cross-border trade in livestock. Foreign 
trade has thus continued, as has private investment, even though it has become 
more opportunistic, small-scale and short-term than before. The markets 
function, with an order of sorts being maintained by a combination of clan 
elders, clergy and militias. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the faith in the 
Somali Shilling persisted for a very long period as the legal and accepted tender 
even though by 2001 four different types of banknotes were in circulation135 The 
aforementioned remittance system ensured a steady influx of foreign currency, 
e.g. via the hawala system.136 Peter Little thus portrayed the economy of this 
war-torn society in rather sanguine terms:  
 
The economy of Somalia goes on, even “booms” in some cases, despite an 
environment of risk and uncertainty. Traders do business and consumers buy 
products, and through it all markets generally follow principles of supply and 
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demand. Conflict disrupts commerce but, like droughts and floods, it becomes just 
another risk element for which the trader, producer, and consumer must adjust.137  
 
Thus describing the armed conflict as “just another risk element”, however, does 
not capture the full impact on society of a prevalence of violence which has now 
lasted for about eighteen years. It may make more sense to describe it as a “war 
economy” in which the profits reaped by certain segments of society give them 
an incentive to perpetuate the fighting, regardless of the chances of winning.138  
 
 
4.5 The Role of Religion  
Like in the rest of East Africa, Islam came to Somalia via the Indian Ocean trade 
(and slaving) routes, where Arab and other traders established gradually 
expanding enclaves along the coast of East Africa.139 Moreover, large numbers 
of Africans were simply converted to Islam via deliberate proselytizing (da’wa), 
mostly by Sufi “holy men.”140 In the area between the Shebelle and Juba rivers, 
an Ajuraan imamate seems to have been in place from the 15th to the 17th 
Century. If not before that, then certainly by the early 16th Century, all of 
Somalia was clearly Muslim.141  
 
The dominant form of Islam has ever since, at least until very recently, been that 
of Sufism.142 Hence the predominance of Sufi orders and brotherhoods 
(especially the Qadiriya, the Ahmediya and the Saalihiya) most of which are 
fairly liberal and often significantly “creolized,” i.e. syncretic. The clergy and 
scholars (ulama), on the other hand, tends to be more orthodox Sunni Muslims, 
and in many cases they are closely related (via clan, ethnic or patron-client 
bonds) to the ruling elites.143 The influence of the more radical and/or 
conservative and fundamentalist Salafi orders (such as Wahhabism) is of a much 
more recent vintage. As argued by Ken Menkhaus, rigid forms of shari’a thus 
tend to be viewed as “an imposition of Gulf Arab customs, seen by most 
Somalis as “un-Somali,” whereas such fundamentalist variants of Islam are 
more likely to attract a popular following among the Somali diasporas in non-
Muslim lands or in Somalia proper when confronted by a foreign and non-
Muslim threat.144  
 
Religion had not played any major political role in Somalia until the 1990s.145 A 
group called Waxda was founded in 1969, promoting the ideas of the Islamist 
reformers such as Qutb and Mawdudi, yet with entirely peaceful means and 
mainly in the present Somaliland. Siyad Barre’s regime nevertheless cracked 
down on them in 1978, thereby apparently further politicizing the organization 
leading its members to support the SNM with its secessionist agenda.146 Neither 
did religious originations play any major role for most of the civil war, except in 
so far as they provided various social services and in the sense that Islam and its 
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various institutions were able to provide a modicum of security. Roland Marchal 
has identified a total of six predominantly religious groups playing a certain 
role: Ahle Sunna wa Jama’a, set up as a counter to the radicals by Aideed, the 
quietist Al Tabliq, Al Majma al Islam, the Wahhabist Ansar-e-Sunna, Al Islaah 
(Somali Islamic Movement) and Al-Ittihad al Islaamiya (AIAI) of which only 
the latter played any role as a combatant in the civil war.147  
 
AIAI is based on Wahhabism and an offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its 
ancestry can be traced back to some of the early Islamic movements such as al-
Ahli (founded in 1978 in Saudi-Arabia) and the Muslim Youth Union (Wahda al 
shabab al-Islam), which subsequently merged to form the Somali Islamic Union 
(SIU, i.e. al-Ittihad) in 1984, posing as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-
Ikhwan al Muslimin) and with some overlap in membership with al-Islah.148 
Frequent allegations to the contrary notwithstanding, it seems to have had only 
weak and inconsequential links to al-Qaeda and similar networks.149 AIAI had a 
militant agenda, based on a combination of nationalism/irredentism and Islam, 
on which it acted during the civil war, mainly in the form of guerrilla warfare. 
However, when it established territorial control (mainly over a couple of ports) 
it made itself vulnerable, in casu to an Ethiopian military intervention in 1996. 
Even before that, they had suffered from attacks launched by the present 
president of the TFG, Abdullah Yuusuf Ahmed, in control of most of what was 
to become the semi-autonomous Puntland, and already supported by Ethiopia.  
 
Following their military defeat in the mid-1990s, AIAI seems to have abandoned 
the armed struggle as well as to have moved most of their activities to the 
Ogaden region of Ethiopia. On two occasions they have engaged in what might 
reasonably be called terrorism, but they are credited by the aforementioned 
MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base with a mere two incidents (one in Somalia 
and one in Ethiopia, both in 1996) with a total of six fatalities and injuries.150 
According to some (Ethiopian) analyst it has primarily pursued a strategy of 
infiltration and it appears to have established some control of various charitable 
organizations allowing it to fund patronage networks, in addition to which it has 
sponsored Islamic courts, which have provided some law to the unruly country. 
There may thus have been pockets of Islamists in all the main, clan-based, 
factions, just as there may have been some infiltration in Puntland, Somaliland, 
perhaps even in Djibouti.151 The veracity of such claims is, however, difficult to 
determine, as most have their origins in Ethiopian intelligence and, it would 
seem, misinformation.  
 
In recent years, however, AIAI seems to have virtually disappeared and it 
remains contested whether it even continues to exist.152 According to a 2005 
report from the UN Security Council’s Monitoring Group on Somalia, however, 
it had not only survived but was running no fewer than seventeen training camps 
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and importing and stockpiling armaments.153 However, the usually at least as 
well-informed International Crisis Group questioned this, whilst pointing to a 
new jihadi group, Al-Shabaab, the comprising among others former AIAI 
combat veterans and led by a young militia leader called Aden Hashi Farah 
‘Ayro, which is alleged to have links with al-Qaeda, even though these links 
have also been questioned as based on quite weak circumstantial evidence.154 
We shall return to some of these questions in the following section.  
 
 
4.6 2006/07: Annus Horribilis for Somalia  
The year 2006 was to become quite dramatic for Somalia, featuring the creation 
of a counter-terrorism alliance of warlords of dubious repute, the establishment 
of control over most of the country by the Islamic courts with a somewhat 
opaque agenda, and an Ethiopian armed intervention of dubious legality which 
was followed in 2007 by a rapid plunge of the country into an abyss of chaos 
and human suffering. Ken Menkhaus is surely right in describing this as a 
tragedy rather than a cataclysm, i.e. an inevitable consequence of  structural 
factors:  
 
[T]he extraordinary events in Somalia since 2005 (..) were by no means preordained. 
The current crisis in Somalia was eminently avoidable, the result of a series of bad 
or cynical decisions and occasionally horrific misjudgments by Somali and foreign 
leaders who should have known better. More than a few of those miscalculations 
were the product of hubris. That qualifies Somalia’s current crisis as a tragedy—in 
this case, a tragedy in five acts.155  
 
Having already dealt with what he calls the first act, i.e. the establishment of the 
TFG, we shall largely skip the second act, i.e. the apparently promising, but 
ultimately failed, security and stabilization plan for Mogadishu, launched in the 
summer of 2005 by the aforementioned break-away faction from the TFG 
(consisting mainly of Hawieye clans, factions and warlords) with some 
participation of civil society. For all its merits, it could also be seen as an trap 
intended for the TFG. If a modicum of security could be established in the 
national capital, it would have been hard for Yusuf’s TFG to refuse a relocation 
to Mogadishu, where he and his government (without foreign support) would be 
at the mercy of the Hawieye elites.156  
 
 
4.6.1. The CIA, the ARPCT and the Terrorist Threat from Somalia 
It all seems to have begun with US efforts to enlist the support for its war on 
terror from various Somali warlords, including some who were formally parts of 
the TFI, but had broken ranks with President Yusuf. Even though it has not been 
officially confirmed, the United States—seemingly acting through the CIA and 
the private military company “Select Armor”—was in the beginning of 2006 
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“handing suitcases full of cash to warlords on the streets of Mogadishu,” as 
bluntly put by John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, who estimated the 
cash flow to be $150,000 per month. The outcome of these efforts was the 
formation in February 2006 of an Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and 
Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT, sometimes referred to as ATA: Anti-Terrorist 
Alliance).157  
 
The rationale for the Bush Administration’s support for the ARPCT was spelled 
out by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jenday Frazer, according 
to whom, “We will work with those elements that will help us root out al-Qaeda 
and to prevent Somalia becoming a safe haven for terrorists, and we are doing it 
in the interest of protecting America.”158 By 2006, the general impression was 
indeed spreading in the United States that Somalia represented a special threat 
with regard to terrorism, but there was very little concrete about this impression, 
e.g. concerning who might do what to whom and how. The US State Department 
in the 2006 edition of its Country Reports on Terrorism thus only listed one 
Somali organization as terrorist, namely the aforementioned (and probably no 
longer existing) AIAI. It further claimed that three individuals were hiding in 
Somalia, enjoying the protection of the Council of Islamic Courts and the al 
Shabaab leadership: Fazul Abdallah Mohammed, Abu Talha al-Sudani, and 
Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, suspected for complicity in the 1998 embassy 
bombings and a 2002 hotel bombing in Kenya.159 The US Treasury further listed 
four individuals (Abbas Abdi Ali, Hassan Dahir Aweys, Ahmad Ali Jimale and 
Abdullahi Hussein Kahie) on its “Terrorist Exclusion List” along with several 
companies and other entities located in Somalia, i.e. Al Barakaat (several 
branches and subsidiaries), Al Haramain (several branches and subsidiaries), 
Heyatul Ulya and Somali Internet Company as well as two organizations located 
elsewhere but providing aid to Somalia—the Somali Network AB (in Sweden) 
and Somali International Relief Organization (in the USA).160 AIAI was 
included in the US “Terrorist Exclusion List,” but not on the US State 
Department’s list of designated “Foreign Terrorist Organisations”.161  
 
These US listings have seemingly been more or less carbon-copied to that of the 
United Nations. The UN Security Council’s “1267 Commission” thus included 
on its list of individuals and entities associated with either the Taliban or Al 
Qaeda the AIAI, Al-Barakaat, Heyatul Ulya, the Somali International Relief 
Organization, the Somali Network Ab as well as Ali Abbas Abdi,  Maxamed 
Cabdullaah Ciise, Hassan Dahir Aweys, Ali Ahmed Nur Jimale, Abdullahi 
Hussein Kahie, and Abdullkadir Hussein Mahamud.162 The European Union’s 
terrorist list, on the other hand, does not list any individuals or entities based in 
Somalia.163  
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4.6.2. The Union of Islamic Courts: A Taliban Regime in the making? 
As so many other steps in the war on terror, the US creation of the ARPCT 
seems to have seriously backfired, as it led directly to a countervailing alliance 
of the various Islamic Court throughout the country which inflicted a decisive 
defeat on the ARPCT in June 2006.164  
 
There is considerable confusion and disagreement about the organizational 
history of these courts, as well as about the name itself.165 As mentioned above, 
shari’a courts had sprung up spontaneously, on a local scale and usually based 
on clans, especially since 1996. A Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was formally 
established in 2002, according to Gérard Prunier,166 whereas others have put the 
founding date somewhat later. The International Crisis Group thus mentions 
2004 as the founding year of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts of Somalia 
(SCIC) as the successor to a Shari’a Implementation Council, established in 
2000.167 In any case, a real unification, also including their paramilitary forces, 
i.e. court militias, only came about in 2006, mainly in response to the formation 
of the ARPCT. On the 20th of February court militias took up arms against the 
ARPCT warlords, producing heavy fighting for the following months, until the 
UIC finally defeated its opponents on the 16th of June.  
 
Having established control of Mogadishu and most of the rest of Somalia 
(except Somaliland), the SCIC proceeded to establish order, actually managing 
to disarm most militias in Mogadishu and elsewhere, dismantle the roadblocks, 
to have the port and airport reopened, etc.—thus offering a significant 
improvement of the quality of daily life for civilian inhabitants.168 They also set 
about governing, albeit in a somewhat incoherent and haphazard fashion—
protecting the environment by banning the charcoal and wildlife trade,169 caring 
for public health by banning the trade in khat and tobacco,170 but also cracking 
down on a radio station and arresting journalists who were unsympathetic to 
their rule.171 As far as the implementation of shari’a, the SCIC sent mixed 
messages, one member reportedly having stated that people who did not pray the 
compulsory five times a day should be shot (sic!).172  
 
The SCIC also vacillated as far as its relations with the TFG were concerned, 
sometimes apparently being prepared for some form of compromise and power-
sharing, sometimes not—which was also the case of the TFG.173 Whereas the 
two sides seem to have partly agreed on the need for integrating their respective 
armed forces,174 the SCIC was just as firm in its rejection of foreign (and 
especially Ethiopian) troops as the TFG was in its insistence on them.175 Indeed, 
the SCIC even proclaimed a defensive jihad against what it saw as (in retrospect, 
correctly) a clandestine Ethiopian military intervention.176 On the other hand, the 
UIC also lent some support to both the Ogaden National Liberation Front 
(consisting of ethnic Somali) and the Oromo Liberation Front,177 just as they 
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forged close relations with Ethiopia’s arch enemy Eritrea which probably saw 
the conflict as a proxy war that might allow it to “get even” with Ethiopia, 
having effectively lost the 1998-2000 war.178  
 
The best explanation of these mixed signals may be that the SCIC was a very 
mixed group without any clear hierarchical structure and with unclear chains of 
command. It featured both moderates such as the chairman Shaykh Sharif 
Shaykh Ahmed or his deputy, Sheykh Abdulkadir Omar, and more radical 
individuals such as former AIAI military commander Shaykh Hassan Dawir 
Aweys (designated by the USA as a terrorist) and the less well-known, but at 
least equally militant, Adan Hashi Ayro, who also seems to be in charge of the 
Al-Shaabab militia and responsible for several, rather nasty, terrorist attacks, 
e.g. on personnel of  humanitarian agencies.179  
 
Apart from such warning signs, analogical reasoning may also have played a 
role on the part of especially the United States, inducing it to abandon its initial 
opposition to an Ethiopian intervention in favor of whole-hearted support for it. 
Not only were the circumstances in Somalia in some respects similar to those in 
Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, but there were also certain undeniable similarities 
between (at least elements within) the UIC and the Taliban around the time of 
the latter’s ascent to power in Afghanistan in 1996.180 Hence, Washington may 
have feared a repetition and have been eager to prevent this, disregarding the 
equally striking differences between the two cases.  
 
 
4.6.3 The TFG and the Ethiopian Intervention 
In December 2006, Ethiopia launched a major assault at the Islamic courts, 
ostensibly on behalf of the TNG. Considering that this was a very uneven battle, 
it was not particularly surprising that the SCIC chose not to fight, but left 
Mogadishu, perhaps to continue the struggle by other means, either as a guerilla 
war or in the form of terrorism181 Nevertheless, fighting continued in the 
following months and was still continuing by the time of writing (end of July 
2007) even though it was unclear whether the main combatants were militant 
Islamists or merely clan-based militias—but, on the other hand obvious, that 
they included a growing number of child soldiers. In any case, the response by 
the Ethiopian forces was very indiscriminate, killing hundreds of civilians and 
displacing hundreds of thousands, especially from the capital—but their 
opponents also “fought dirty,” e.g. attacking humanitarian and UN agencies, and 
using roadside bombs.182  
 
Following the eviction of the UIC from Mogadishu, the TFG was now, at long 
last, able to establish its seat of government in the national capital, albeit only 
thanks to the continued Ethiopian militant support. It was somewhat equivocal 
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about its relationship with the remnants of the defeated UIC, some 
spokespersons expressing the intention of co-opting at least moderate elements 
into the TFIs, but others taking a less conciliatory position. As so often before, 
however, the TFG’s ability to actually govern the country was extremely 
limited, also because they had lost most of whatever legitimacy they might have 
enjoyed in the first place by aligning so closely with what was seen by most 
Somali as a hostile invader and occupant. It probably did not help either that the 
TFG President explicitly endorsed the air strikes which the United States 
launched against Somalia in the wake of the Ethiopian intervention in January 
2007, apparently killing more than thirty innocent civilians. While both the 
United Nations and the European Union criticized the air strikes, Yusuf 
condoned them with the argument that the USA “has the right to bombard 
terrorist suspects who attacked its embassies.” Nor did he object to the transfer 
of at least one Somali detainees to the Guantanamo prison.183 In May the 
Transitional Federal Parliament further passed an anti-terrorism bill introduced 
the TFG, allowing the latter to freeze property of people suspected of (as 
opposed to found guilty of) terrorist activities. An even more draconian measure 
included in the same bill was the institution of capital punishment for 
membership of a terrorist organization—regardless of whether this entailed 
actual terrorist activities.184  
 
The situation was thus quite volatile and the future unpredictable by the summer 
of 2007. Before nevertheless venturing some guesses about the future, it seems 
appropriate to provide an overview of the various external actors involved.  
 
 
4.7 External Actors  
The 2006/7 crisis brought into play a number of external actors, most of whom 
have been pursuing their national or organizational agendas regardless of their 
compatibility with the interests of the Somali people.  
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The various humanitarian agencies constituted a partial exception, doing their 
best to cater for the innocent victims of the struggle, the refugees and internally 
displaced persons, under extremely challenging circumstances.185 As will be 
obvious from the account above, the United States has been quite active 
throughout the crisis, yet almost exclusively pursuing its own security agenda 
with little regard for the Somali population. In addition to this, a plethora of 
neighboring states and international organizations have also been involved.  
 
The complex picture of external support has been summarized in Fig. 2, in 
which ordinary arrows signify support and block arrows antagonism. If it 
appears confusing this simply testifies to its approximate accuracy, as the 
situation is indeed very complex and confusing.  
 
 
4.7.1. Neighbors 
Ethiopia has obviously been a major player, partly driven by legitimate security 
concerns—which does not mean that its actions have actually enhanced 
Ethiopian national security. Meles Zenavi and his government have probably 
been sincerely worried about the perceived rise to prominence of their old foe, 
the AIAI (even though they seem to have vastly exaggerated its importance and 
strength), especially considering that it seemed to hoist the irredentist flag once 
again. They have probably also been concerned about a possible spill-over of 
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Islamism from Somalia to their own population (about half of whom are 
Muslims),186 especially considering the links forged between the UIC and the 
Ogaden and Oromo liberation movements, i.e. the Ogaden National Liberation 
Front (ONLF), the little known United Western Somali Liberation Front 
(UWSLF) and the Oromo OLF.187 Finally, they have surely been concerned 
about the prospects of Somalia’s falling under the influence of Eritrea.  
 
Eritrea has throughout been a minor, but significant player, apparently 
supporting the UIC/SCIC with weapons—in clear violation of the UN embargo 
(vide infra). Eritrea’s support has not been based on any religious or ideological 
affinity, as the regime of President Isaias Afwerki’s PFDJ (People’s Front for 
Democracy and Justice, an offspring of the old EPLF) is not at all Islamist (or 
even Muslim), but Christian and secular.188 In fact, the regime is opposed by a 
couple of Islamist (and partly jihadist) rebel groups. The main opponents of the 
regime are the remnants of the former ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front), most of 
which are self-proclaimed Islamist. Some of them have at various stages 
resorted to an armed struggle, featuring elements of terrorism. This has, for 
instance, been the case of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EJI, sometimes referred to 
as EJIM: Eritrean Islamic Jahid Movement), founded in 1988 and based in 
Sudan, but operating in Eritrea since 1989, i.e. prior to independence, and 
allegedly related to al-Qaeda Its leader in 1998 described the goals of the 
movement as “to realize our position as servants of Allah, and to establish the 
Islamic State.”.189 What has spurred the support of the PFDJ regime for Islamist 
forces in Somalia has thus rather been the wish to support whomever Ethiopia 
was opposing according to the “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” logic—or 
even its derivative, “my enemy’s friend’s enemy is my friend,” as may have 
been the explanation for Asmara’s support for the rebels—especially JEM 
(Justice and Equality Movement)—in the Darfur province of Sudan, viewed as 
opposing the government of Sudan, in turn seen as aligned with Ethiopia.190 
Following the Ethiopian intervention and considering IGAD’s continued support 
for the TFG and its arch-enemy, Eritrea decided to suspend its membership of 
IGAD.191  
 
The role of Sudan role seems to have been minor and on the whole rather 
constructive, e.g. much more even-handed than one might have expected from a 
government based on Islamism. Khartoum has thus remained neutral throughout 
the conflict, but played the role as honest broker, e.g. during the stand-off 
between the TFG and the SCIC where Sudan hosted reconciliation talks between 
the opposing sides.192  
 
Kenya’s role has been less central than one might have expected, considering 
that a good deal of the refugees from Somalia are bound to end up across their 
common border—and in view of its historical problems with Somali irredentism 
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and its alleged (but probably vastly exaggerated) “Islamist problem.”193 
Whatever substantive role Nairobi has taken has followed the multilateral track, 
i.e. it has been working through IGAD (vide infra). Without really taking a stand 
on the substance, however, Kenya has been collaborating closely with the 
United States by helping to close the border to Somalia (in breach of 
international obligations) and apprehend people suspected by Washington (or 
Ethiopia) of being aligned with terrorists.194  
 
 
4.7.2 International Organizations 
Having served as the “midwife” of the TFG, it is hardly surprising that the 
subregional organization for the HoA, IGAD, has been unswervingly on the side 
of this so-called “government,” also because Ethiopia has a large say in the 
organization. IGAD was thus, from the very start, very favorably inclined 
towards the TFG’s request for armed protection.195 as well as in favor of a 
relaxation of the arms embargo on Somalia in order to allow for a build-up of 
armed forces loyal to Yusuf and his entourage.196 In June 2006 the organization 
(minus Eritrea) followed Kenya’s lead in imposing various sanctions, including 
a travel ban, on what it called “warlords,” some of whom they also wanted 
prosecuted for crimes against humanity.197 Likewise without Eritrea’s 
participation, IGAD heads of state and government met in January for an 
extraordinary meeting at which they voiced no opinion on the Ethiopian 
intervention, yet took note of its intention to withdraw, urging the international 
community to take steps to prevent the emergence of a “security vacuum.”198 
Due to the organization’s weakness, however, its actual role has mainly 
consisted in putting pressure on the African Union.  
 
The AU, in turn, could not easily go against one of the REC’s designated as its 
operational arms in the making—or against the expressed wishes of its host 
country, Ethiopia—and especially not at a historical juncture where its utility 
was being assessed by the world community with a view to granting much 
needed external support.199 Moreover, considering that the OAU had already 
recognized the TNG, the AU chose to view the TFG as a simple successor 
which made its support for the latter almost preordained.200 The actual role of 
the AU was, however, quite modest, mainly because of a lack of armed forces 
and other resources. Having first dispatched a fact-finding mission and then 
acknowledged the need for the dispatch of “peacekeepers” to assist the TFG—
and having endorsed the proposal by the United States and IGAD to lift of relax 
the arms embargo the Peace and Security Council in January 2007 mandated a 
peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) to take over from the Ethiopian forces. Even 
though it was mandated to comprise 8,000 troops —and partly financed by EU 
and US support of €15,000 and $14,000, respectively—by the time of writing, 
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however, only Uganda had actually sent forces which had come under heavy fire 
and proved unable to establish even a modicum of peace in Mogadishu.201  
 
The role of the United Nations has been predominantly reactive, presumably 
because neither the organization as such nor the veto-weilding powers in the 
Security Council would want to land themselves in a situation resembling that of 
the early 1990s, obliging them to intervene (vide supra). The UNSC thus passed 
a total of twelve resolutions on Somalia since 2001 compared to fourteen in the 
years 1992-95, most of them dealing with the arms embargo which was imposed 
on Somalia in 1992 (UNSCR 733). In 2003 a Monitoring Group was established 
under the auspices of the Council’s Sanctions Committee, which has ever since 
produced very detailed and insightful reports on the various breaches of the 
embargo.202 It has, for instance, documented extensive violations of the 
regulations by several states, especially Ethiopia (in support of the TFG) and 
Eritrea in support of, first, the splinter faction of the TFIs from Mogadishu and 
then the UIC. This should be added the clandestine (and usually denied) support 
provided by Uganda and Kenya to the TFG and the even more secret support 
provided to the UIC by Arab countries such as Egypt, Libya and Syria as well as 
by Djibouti and Iran, not to mention the assistance provided by Hezbollah and 
even the Al Qaeda.203  
 
Throughout the present crisis, the Secretary General has presented regular 
situation reports and the Security Council has passed several resolutions,  mainly 
endorsing the various IGAD and AU initiatives (e.g. in UNSCR 1725 of 6 
December 2006) for an international force whilst making it clear that this also 
entails the specification included in the IGAD deployment plan, according to 
which “those States that border Somalia would not deploy troops to Somalia” 
(art. 4). There was thus no ex ante authorization of the Ethiopian intervention 
(UNSCR 1725, art. 4). The Council did, however, amend the embargo to allow 
for the deployment of AMISOM (UNSCR 1744, art. 4-6).204 By the time of 
writing (ultimo July 2007), some consideration had been given to the 
deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation, but no decisions had been taken. 
The requisite strength of such a mission, even under the most optimistic 
assumptions, was estimated at around 20,000 troops with substantial air and 
maritime components.205  
 
The Arab League has played a minor role as mediator in the crisis, mostly acting 
in consort with the AU and occasionally the United Nations,206 as has been the 
case of the European Union. An International Contact Group has been 
established, comprising the EU, Italy, Kenya, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, the 
UK, the United States, the AU, IGAD, the League of Arab States, and the UN. 
At its meeting in January 2007, however, it merely took note of the new 
situation.207  
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4.8 Scenarios for the Future  
By the time of writing in late July 2007, the prospects for the future looked very 
bleak indeed. The TFG and what was left of the UIC still had not come to terms 
with each other and the reconciliation conference between the two kept being 
postponed. The general security situation in the country had deteriorated 
considerably compared to one year earlier when the UIC was in control, and the 
TFG seemed completely unable to actually govern the country. The number of 
refugees and internally displaced persons had skyrocketed and the humanitarian 
crisis was very severe indeed, featuring shortages of just about everything— 
except weapons and ammunition. Rather than pretending to know what the 
future holds in store for the Somali, we may try to sketch the contours of an 
optimistic and a pessimistic scenario—hoping that the former will materialize 
whilst being more inclined to believe that the latter will.  
Optimists might hope that the TFG with the help of its foreign supporters may 
be able to actually establish control of at least Mogadishu and parts of the rest of 
the country before its mandate expires in 2009.208 If the TFG manages to co-opt 
significant parts of the present opposition, e.g. influential members of the 
Hawyiye clan in and around the capital as well as (moderate, but still 
representative) Islamists, it may come to be viewed as reasonably legitimate by 
a major part of the population—especially if it manages to keep its Ethiopian 
backers at arms length and only draw on their support discretely. If the 
international community honors its pledges of support, the government might 
have enough funds available for distribution to actually achieve an improvement 
of the daily lives of its citizens. If so, it might achieve a “performance 
legitimacy” to make up for its shortage of procedural legitimacy, in which case 
its opponents may gradually come to be viewed by the Somali as spoilers rather 
than as freedom fighters protecting the nation against the Ethiopian foe. Not 
only might this benefit the Somali, but it might also make them less inclined to 
support terrorism, thus also furthering the national security of both Ethiopia and 
the United States. In other words, the Somali crisis could be contained as well as 
mitigated rather than spreading and escalating. Unfortunately, however, all its 
conceivability and indisputable attractions notwithstanding, this scenario does 
not seem at all likely at the present juncture.  
 
A pessimistic—but in the present author’s opinion much more realistic—is 
premised on the assumption that the TFG regime is devoid of inherent 
legitimacy in the eyes that matter, i.e. those of the Somali nation. Not only was 
its coming into being somewhat questionable—exacerbated by its subsequent 
bending of the rules—but it is simply not sufficiently representative of the entire 
Somali nation, as it excludes some of the most important clans as well as other 
strata of the nation, defined in religious terms. “A victor’s peace in 
contemporary Somalia is a fantasy,” as aptly put by Ken Menkhaus.209 Trying to 
make up for the unsatisfactory representatively and governing capacity by 
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drawing heavily on Ethiopian (and American) support simply detracts further 
from what little legitimacy the regime might have had in the first place by giving 
it a “Quisling image.” This, in turn, makes the Somalia oppose the regime, either 
directly by taking up arms against it or indirectly, by lending moral and material 
support to those who do—perhaps even including terrorist.  
 
Even though no armed conflict escalates in a linear fashion, but all have their 
ups and downs, there is no reason to expect the temporary lull in the fighting 
following the brutal Ethiopian offensive in Mogadishu to be more than just 
that—as the regime’s opponents can afford to bide their time and launch new 
assaults at what they deem to be an opportune moment. There is thus every 
reason to expect the conflict to continue as well as to spread to neighboring 
countries, mainly Ethiopia. While some of it may take the form of guerrilla 
warfare, it is also very likely that it will feature terrorist attacks conducted by the 
remnants of the UIC and its allies. The major attack against an oil field in 
Ethiopia by the ONLF, with a death toll of 74, may thus be a harbinger of worse 
to come.210  
It is also entirely conceivable that elements from the routed UIC—perhaps 
especially the Al-Shabaab, rather than AIAI—may join forces with Al-Qaeda, 
and that this may be motivated just as much by the “my enemy’s enemy is my 
ally” logic than by ideological-religious sympathy or affinity. In its turn, Al 
Qaeda is clearly welcoming the opening of a new battlefield in Somalia in 
addition to those in Afghanistan and Iraq, as is obvious from recent statements 
by Al-Zawahiri—often, albeit somewhat misleadingly, referred to as the second-
in-command of AQ:   
 
The near-term plan consists of targeting Crusader-Jewish interests, as everyone who 
attacks the Muslim Ummah must pay the price, in our country and theirs, in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia, and everywhere we are able to strike their 
interests... And the long-term plan is divided into two halves: The first half consists 
of earnest, diligent work, to change these corrupt and corruptive regimes.... As for 
the second half of the long-term plan, it consists of hurrying to the fields of jihad like 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, for jihad preparation and training. Thus, it is a must 
to hurry to the fields of jihad for two reasons: The first is to defeat the enemies of the 
Ummah and repel the Zionist Crusade, and the second is for jihadi preparation and 
training to prepare for the next stage of the jihad.211  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The above analysis has, hopefully, shown that much of the attention paid by the 
international community, and especially the United States under the auspices of 
its War on Terror, is based on erroneous premises. Neither has the Horn seen 
many terrorist attacks in the paqst, nor were there prior to the dramatic events in 
Somalia in 2006-07 any reasons to expect so for the future. There did not seem 
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to be much fertile soil for the seeds of Islamist extremism which some, including 
the Al Qaeda network, tried to sow there. Even though the subregion was host to 
several intractable conflicts most took the form of ordinary guerrilla war rather 
than terrorism, and most were primarily motivated by political grievances and 
nationalism rather than by religious fervor.  
 
This was also the case of Somali, as the rather elaborate case study has tried to 
demonstrate. This conflict-ridden country has experienced a host of problems 
throughout its history, most of them related to the frustrated national ambitions 
and weak state structures—and ever since around 1990 the country has been at a 
state of war, pitting clans against each other with their respective political 
superstructures and in ever-changing patterns of alignments, both internally and 
with external players. Religious extremism has never been predominant and, at 
most, an epiphenomenon, i.e. a vehicle for articulating political grievances and 
rallying support for a political cause, rather than a motive for conflict at such. 
Moreover, contrary to prevailing opinion, Somalia has been neither a battlefield, 
staging area or breeding ground for terrorism, not even after its effective state 
collapse. Failed states are not nearly as attractive to terrorists groups or networks 
as moderately weak and/or moderately strong but sympathetic states.  
 
There was thus no good reasons for the United States to fear terrorism in or from 
Somalia, but such fear were nevertheless a reality. Ironically, just as in Iraq—
where there were no terrorists prior to the American invasion, but which was 
transformed by the invasion into the most terror-ridden country in the world—
the steps taken by the USA to curtail a non-existent terrorist threat seems to have 
created one. When the United States sponsored a warlord alliance against 
terrorism it inadvertently helped bringing to power and subsequently 
radicalizing islamist forces. When it along with its ally Ethiopia then resorted to 
military force to dislodge these islamists from power, they may well have 
transformed them into a terrorist foe which may cause both of them considerable 
trouble in the years to come.  
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